Independence* Day

Issue 1 / Chapter 1

In Chapter 1, we solved two mysteries but wound up with even more questions. We learned why so many Cameroonians lack reliable access to drinking water: Cameroon is ruled by a kleptocrat dictator who won’t build out water infrastructure or anything else that might benefit ordinary Cameroonians. Unfortunately, Paul Biya has ruled Cameroon for more than four decades due to the many ingenious methods he has perfected to maintain his grip on power. His ingenuity is exceeded only by his greed; Biya puts his hunger for power and wealth ahead of the needs of Cameroon. Yet, even if a democratic government somehow took control of Cameroon, they would still be limited by Cameroon’s massive debts: each year, a fifth to a quarter of all government revenue is devoted to debt servicing.

But how did Cameroon come to be ruled by a corrupt dictator, and how did Cameroon become so indebted?

We also solved the mystery of Lake Chad’s collapse. Desertification and irresponsible agricultural diversions explain the catastrophe. We learned about the science of desertification and the proven methods to reverse it. These methods are not only effective but also shockingly cheap and easy to implement.

But these answers, too, left us with even more questions. If it’s becoming obvious that the diversions from the Chari-Logone river system are unsustainable, why do they continue? And if desertification is so easy to reverse, why hasn’t it been? After all, as a technological problem, desertification has been solved for many decades – as long as desertification has been a widespread problem in the Sahel.

Understanding Cameroon’s history is essential to answering these questions. In this chapter, we’ll see how Cameroon became a dictatorship.

Cameroon became a dictatorship as it became independent from France. Thus, to understand Cameroon’s dictatorship, we must understand its colonial history.

Colonization: a story of cooperation

It is a common misconception that colonization is a conflict between colonizers and the colonies. This is untrue. Many people in a colonized country support being colonized, and many people in a colonizing country oppose colonization. Cameroon’s history cannot be understood without understanding that some indigenous Cameroonians benefitted from the colonial arrangement and sought to preserve it. Of course, the vast majority of Cameroonians did not cooperate with colonizers and would never have oppressed their Cameroonian brothers and sisters for any price. Indeed, much of this chapter and a bonus chapter focuses on Cameroon’s independence movement, and we will be inspired by the fearlessness and selflessness with which countless Cameroonians fought against colonization. But overall, this phenomenon – a society’s elites collaborating with outside oppressors – occurred wherever colonization did.

Indigenous cooperation with European colonizers began before there were African colonies. Coastal Cameroon is a natural port on the western coast of Africa. This made it an ideal location for European trade as it was the closest protected port geographically to Europe.

Europeans were interested in enslaved people for their other colonies. For a century or so beginning in 1530, the Portuguese dominated the slave trade, paying coastal African tribes to abduct Africans from inland tribes. The European slave traders never got their hands dirty; they didn’t even come ashore, instead conducting business with indigenous African slave dealers on their ships with anchors dropped just offshore. Ultimately, the Portuguese monopoly was broken, and slave traders from all over Europe poured in, hoping to strike it rich. In 1827, the transatlantic slave trade – though not slavery itself – mercifully ended when the British outlawed slavery and then ordered the British navy to use Fernando Po, an island off the coast of Cameroon, as a base of operations to actively suppress the slave trade.

In sum, for 500 hundred years, present-day Cameroon was the center of the slave trade. The violence, insecurity, and disappearance of young men and women in their prime were devastating to African societies. An estimated 12.5 million people were loaded onto slave ships crossing the Atlantic Ocean, and around 1.5 million died en route – though the true numbers could be much higher. Additionally, millions more died from the constant warfare and raids caused by slave traders’ insatiable appetite for abduction.

Cameroon was not formally colonized until 1884. In his classic book The Scramble for Africa, Thomas Packenham documents how Cameroonian chiefs and princes – themselves slave owners – repeatedly petitioned the British monarchy to establish a formal colony in Cameroon, no doubt believing they could expand their wealth through colonization. However, the Germans were the first to set up a formal colony there.

In 1905, Matthias Erzberger, a member of the German Parliament from the Center Party, exposed to the public two gruesome genocides the German army was carrying out in its colony of German South West Africa (modern day Namibia). This had been a well-kept secret, and its exposure led to widespread outrage. This news broke almost almost simultaneously to reports of cruelty meted out in Cameroon, with German soldiers massacring entire villages and practicing a very violent form of slavery on German plantations. These scandals caused such a political crisis that the chancellor dissolved parliament and called new elections.

Both pro- and anti-colonization German parties believed that colonization was their winning issue and campaigned so hard on the issue that the 1906 German parliamentary elections became a referendum on colonization. The anti-colonization Social Democrats and Center Parties trounced the pro-colonization parties. This decisive win led to substantial reforms in German colonies, including Cameroon. Unfortunately, it didn’t end colonization.

Anti-colonization sentiment in Germany notwithstanding, Cameroon remained a German colony until the French and British conquered Cameroon in World War I. France took four-fifths of Cameroon and the British took one-fifth. Life in colonial Cameroon did not improve under the French. Richard A. Joseph – a political scientist at Northwestern and an expert on Cameroon’s modern history – stated that,

In fact, the only real difference between the German and French periods of primary colonization is that whereas the Germans could point to a number of accomplishments despite the suffering imposed on the people, the French achievements, by any measure, were very meager[.]

Prior to World War II, the League of Nations – precursor to the United Nations – was monitoring French Cameroon for, among other things,  the suspiciously high death rate of forced laborers. Similarly, extraordinary abuse came from the French elevation of local chiefs, who in some cases had merely symbolic power, as colonial administrators. The French cared only that taxes were paid on time, roads to the port were maintained, and an adequate number of workers (plus the food they needed) were amassed to build the railroads. Under the French, local chiefs badly abused their power, demanding more tax than was due to the colonizers and pocketing the rest; exempting their own clan from French requirements of workers and food; conscripting more men as laborers than the French demanded, then forcing them to work on their private plantation. In 1925, France established the counseils des notables, advisory councils of Cameroonian chiefs. The League of Nations observers were astonished to find that the councils approved increases in taxes, and in some cases had actually proposed increases in taxes themselves. It is not difficult to understand why these Cameroonian elites would prefer an uncontested space of power within French rule – however barbaric – to independence.

In sum, from indigenous slave dealers to the conseils des notables, the worst impulses of Europeans were happily aided by indigenous elites who found it more profitable to be on the wrong side of history.

Cameroon’s independence movement: The good, the bad, and the ugly

With this brief history of colonial Cameroon, we can turn to Cameroon’s fight for independence in order to answer the question posted at the beginning of the chapter: Why did Cameroon become a dictatorship?

The history behind Cameroon’s struggle for independence is fascinating, and it helps to follow four key characters throughout the struggle. The pithy “good, bad and ugly” fits well here.

The good: Ruben Um Nyobe

Ruben Um Nyobe was the leader of Cameroon’s independence movement. Even his opponents conceded that he was an indefatigable debater. He was an exceptional public speaker, whether addressing a tiny rural hamlet or the entire United Nations General Assembly. He was tireless, committed, and effective. Um Nyobe gave up his personal life for the cause of independence. He was constantly harassed by the French, always working and traveling for the cause and ever looking over his shoulder due to constant death threats.

Um Nyobe is today revered as the founding father of Cameroon.

The bad: Ahmaduo Ahidjo and Charles Assale

Ahmaduo Ahidjo was a product of the political machine that dominated most of northern Cameroon. The United States had many political machines in the late 1800s. You may recall from your high school history class that New York was dominated by a vast political machine known as Tammany Hall. It was so powerful that it was able to hand-pick the American vice president.

Northern Cameroon had a massive political machine run by elites from the Fulani ethnic group. The Fulani machine rigidly controlled a whopping 40% of the total population of French Cameroon. That would be as though Tammany Hall controlled not just New York City (and wielded great influence outside New York) – it would be as though Tammany Hall controlled the entire eastern seaboard, from Florida and Georgia, through Maryland and Pennsylvania, and up to Maine. The Fulani machine was tightly allied with the French colonial administration and north Cameroon’s business elites. It was all about money: allying with the French was profitable, so the Fulani machine bosses and business elites were steadfast French allies.

In a darkly fascinating bonus chapter 3, we look under the hood to see how political machines work and how they can become so powerful.

Ambitious, shrewd, and skilled at machine politics, Ahidjo deftly climbed the ranks of the Fulani machine. Ahidjo profited from his connections both to the machine and the French, so he was unsurprisingly outspoken in opposition to independence. But if supporting independence were more profitable for Ahidjo, he would have switched sides in a heartbeat.

Charles Assale was from southern Cameroon. Like Ahidjo, he was smart, skilled, and totally without scruples, willing to do anything that advanced his interests. Like Ahidjo, Assale’s stance on independence depended on what was most convenient.

The ugly: Andre-Marie Mbida

Like the others on this list, Mbida was an exceptionally gifted politician. He was the leader of the Catholic party, Bloc Democratique Camerounais (BDC). He won a seat in the Cameroonian Assembly’s first college as a black man, a testament to his skills as a politician. Unlike Ahidjo and Assale, he was deeply religious and had a strong moral compass. He never took shortcuts or compromised his deeply held moral values, no matter the cost. Mbida was earnestly committed to his Catholic principles of improving the lives of the poor. He had a plan to lift the fortunes of ordinary Cameroonians and was devoted to seeing that plan through.

However, Mbida naively believed that the best way to achieve a more prosperous and fair Cameroon was through the French. He was entirely against independence and did whatever he could to subvert the independence movement.

Strategies: Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC)

Cameroon’s independence movement was called the Union des Populations du Cameroun, or UPC. UPC was a classic civic organization. UPC was based on local chapters, which were strongest in southeastern Cameroon and in cities and plantations where union organizing was strong. Chapter meetings were so large that they could only be hosted outside.

The most important work occurred at the chapter level, but there were bodies of UPC members working to coordinate local work toward a set of unified goals. Central Committees were established to help local chapters coordinate their efforts. As the UPC grew larger and larger, there were too many Central Committees, and Regional Committees were established to help coordinate the work of several Central Committees. The Central Executive Committee, elected by the UPC Congress, oversaw the entire organization.

On paper, the highest authority of UPC was the Congress, which met every few years. However, the local chapters remained the most important: most of the work of the UPC took place at the local chapter level, and members of the Congress were elected by local chapters. UPC also established numerous other organizations, from cultural organizations to organizations fighting for women’s rights. They printed a monthly newspaper, Voix du peuple du Cameroun, circulated to all the local UPC chapters. UPC was funded exclusively through member dues. It’s amazing what the UPC accomplished with nothing more than the time and modest monetary contributions of individual members in one of the poorest countries in the world.

Above all, UPC was committed to working within the system, however unfair that system was. They contested elections, circulated newspapers, and held open meetings. They avoided violence at all costs. From its inception, UPC publications and leader speeches correctly identified that the most effective strategy by the French was to provoke violence in order to justify a violent response. The key, UPC leaders and publications at all levels argued, was to avoid taking the bait and always to remain peaceful.

Strategies: The French and allies

French colonial officials are totally on the wrong side of history. Nothing is redeeming about the French characters in this story, who used violence and lies to impoverish and oppress Cameroon. There was nothing positive about their rule; whenever they did something positive for Cameroon, it was because they were forced to.

The exception was the French Communists, who were stalwart allies of UPC. They will make a few appearances in this story at crucial moments.

While there were white colonists who sympathized with and even supported UPC, as a body, the white settlers were even more willing to use violence and less willing to grant even small social reform than the French colonial administration. And, of course, the French had plenty of help from Cameroon’s elites like Ahidjo, Assale, and Mbida.

The key strategy that never changes for the French is to provoke violence from Cameroonians who may not even be members of UPC, then to use the violence as an excuse to mete out violence of their own and repress UPC.

If you are a paid supporter, now is a good time to stop and check on the first bonus chapter, which covers the absolutely riveting story of the Cameroonian independence movement from 1945 to 1957.

Picking up the story in 1957

We’re picking up the story of Cameroonian independence in 1957. High Commissioner Messmer, showing the sharp political acumen that would later help him ascend to prime minister of France 15 years later, played a masterful routine as good cop in 1957. He convinced the United Front – the non-UPC pro-independence moderates – that he was on their side, then pulled the rug out from under them right before the 1956 elections for Cameroon Assembly. This move left the United Front coalition in total disarray right before the elections. Messmer was so persuasive in lying to the United Front that he even fooled the very talented and opportunistic Charles Assale, who had not left the coalition and, as a result, faced the only loss of his career.

UPC candidates were banned from running, even as independents. The college system, which only permitted a small percentage of Cameroonians the right to vote, plus the Fulani political machine, also worked against pro-independence candidates.

Messmer’s tricks, combined with the grossly unfair nature of the electoral system ensured that – even though the overwhelming majority of Cameroonians favored independence – anti-independence candidates won in a landslide. Anti-independence parties won so big that pro-independence parties were totally locked out of government. 50 seats went to anti-independence parties: 30 seats to the north Cameroon Fulani machine led by Ahmaduo Ahidjo, and 20 seats to Andre-Marie Mbida’s UDC party, mostly from central and southeast Cameroon. Charles Assale, in a rare mistake, followed Soppo Priso to electoral disaster. Assale and Priso were among the eight seats won by the United Front. With nine seats, even independents had a better showing than United Front.

Shortly after orchestrating this considerable win for France, Messmer was unceremoniously transferred to Equatorial Guinea. He had been in Cameroon barely a year. This seems incongruent with French policy, as we learned about in the bonus chapter. For example, High Commissioner Soucadaux was transferred because he had totally failed to slow the growth of UPC. With Messmer so successful in stopping the UPC, why should he be replaced?

The reason is that the French were sending Jean Ramadier directly from Paris with very specific instructions.

Dirty wars in Algeria and Vietnam

To understand Ramadier’s mission, it is necessary to understand what else the French empire was dealing with. France had colonial global holdings and struggled to maintain its grip following the catastrophe of the Second World War. In southeast Asia, the French fought the Vietnamese independence movement for eight bloody years. 21,000 French soldiers were killed before France admitted defeat and handed that disastrous war off to the US in 1955. Just before admitting defeat in Vietnam, the French became embroiled in another notoriously gruesome war of independence, this time in Algeria. After seven years of war, 30,000 French soldiers lay dead with an additional 65,000 wounded. France again admitted defeat in 1962.

These wars proved disastrous for France—not merely because they lost both at immense financial and human cost, but because both badly tarnished France’s reputation internationally due to the barbarous tactics the French employed against people fighting for their freedom. Even the French public grew increasingly wary of the wars, creating such intense domestic turmoil that France experienced two separate coups.

So why is France’s dirty war in Cameroon lesser known than its wars in Algeria and Vietnam? One reason is the way it was fought. Instead of using French troops, Messmer secretly hired African mercenaries, who had the additional advantage of costing less than French soldiers. With French intelligence, planning, support, coordination, and sometimes direct participation, mercenaries massacred entire Cameroonian villages and committed other atrocities.

The other reason is that the French realized that Europeans could no longer win wars of independence, so they tried a new strategy.

CFA franc

The key to the French strategy was the CFA franc. In 1945, France created the CFA franc as the new currency for fourteen of its African colonies, including Cameroon. The CFA franc was so unfair that no country with free and fair elections would ever accept it. France’s three African colonies that won independence – Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria – could have chosen to use the CFA franc, but opted to create their own currencies. In 1960, the French magazine La Croix estimated that the CFA franc was saving the French 250 million dollars per year (adjusted for inflation, that is $2.7 billion in 2024 dollars), and further estimated that the livelihoods of 500,000 French people depended on the unfair conditions of the CFA franc.

We’ll see below how the CFA franc allowed France to plunder the economies of African countries below. But for now, try to put yourself in Ramadier’s shoes. The CFA franc had been forced on Cameroon in order to help France get richer by making Cameroon poorer. What if there were some way to get Cameroon to accept the CFA franc voluntarily? If so, there would be no need to fight a war and face the inevitable blowback: dead French soldiers, angry French voters, and a global backlash. France could simply leave. As long as Cameroon were using the CFA franc, France would have all the benefits of colonization.

But how could Cameroon be convinced to accept the CFA franc?

Fortunately for the French, Cameroon’s elections were anything but democratic. At this point in the story, in 1957, Cameroon’s legislative body, the Assembly, is extremely unrepresentative, even by French standards. Even though the vast majority of Cameroon favors independence, the vast majority of elected representatives are against independence. And Cameroon’s president and vice president, Andre-Marie Mbida and Ahmaduo Ahidjo, are both against independence.

Ramadier is about to make President Mbida an offer he can’t refuse.

“Giving independence to those who call for it least”

In January 1958, Ramadier’s plane landed in Cameroon. He carried a single suitcase and arrived without his family. He immediately sat down with Mbida and made him an offer he couldn’t refuse: we will make you a dictator, with more power than you ever dreamed. In exchange, you need to sign away Cameroon’s future by agreeing to the CFA franc.

In his memoirs, Messmer described the French strategy as “giving independence to those who call for it least,” and Mbida had long been a steadfast ally of France and an outspoken opponent of independence. Ramadier probably thought Mbida would accept. But Mbida wasn’t like the other anti-independence politicians who supported whatever gave them the most power and wealth. Mbida couldn’t be bought for any price. He was devoutly religious and committed to doing what he believed was right, no matter the consequences. Mbida’s moral compass was unshakeable. Mbida refused.

Surprised but undeterred, Ramadier then sat down with the vice president, Ahidjo, and made the same offer. As we’ll see in the third bonus chapter, Ahidjo had no principles. He accepted Ramadier’s offer. Ahidjo will become more powerful than his wildest dreams, and France will be able to continue profiting at the expense of Cameroon through the CFA franc, without having to fight another disastrous war of independence.

So far, so good for Ahidjo and Ramadier. But their plan couldn’t work with Mbida as president. They needed to find some way to get rid of Mbida.

The coup

Mbida, a constant enemy of independence, has now taken on the unlikely role of Cameroon’s savior. He is the only one protecting Cameroon from decades of poverty and dictatorship.

After some planning, Ahidjo and Ramadier set their trap. Ramadier gave a speech to the Cameroon Assembly stating that France was prepared to grant Cameroon independence. In a head-snapping turn, Ahidjo suddenly favored independence after publicly opposing it for so many years. Mbida was outraged, arguing—correctly—that Ramadier had overstepped his legal authority.

In order to save himself, Mbida needed to whip support in the Assembly to shore up his position. He didn’t. Instead, he flew to Paris and leveraged all of his personal connections to plead his case to French politicians and journalists. Mbida naively believed that his many years of service to France—and being on the right side of the law—would ensure he prevailed. He didn’t realize that he was disposable and that the rules were only followed when the French decided they should be.

With Mbida in Paris, Ahidjo and Ramadier had no difficulty outmaneuvering him in the Assembly. The Fulani political machine foresaw immense profit if one of their capos became dictator, and so on his orders, Ahidjo’s entire party resigned from Mbida’s parliamentary coalition, calling for a vote of no confidence. Meanwhile, Ramadier bribed other Assembly members into supporting a vote of no confidence. By the time Mbida returned to Cameroon, he had no way out. Ahidjo and Ramadier had won over more than enough members of the Assembly to force a vote of no confidence.

Rather than face a vote of no confidence, Mbida resigned. Ahidjo became president.

Ahidjo, who had published an open letter only a few months prior in late 1956 that opposed independence, suddenly led the charge on independence. In 1958, the Assembly – packed with people who opposed independence only months earlier – passed a resolution that France should recognize Cameroon’s right to independence. In 1959, France conferred full internal authority to Cameroon, effective January 1, 1960; France retained limited rights, including the right to intervene in case of armed insurrection or war. Ahidjo secretly signed away Cameroon’s future in a series of agreements that included the CFA franc.

Ahidjo was invited to testify before the UN General Assembly, and he somehow convinced them to recognize the independence process as legitimate. This finally freed Ahidjo and the French from UN oversight. As discussed in Bonus Chapter 1, gaining attention from the UN was UPC’s most effective strategy, and it was nearly decisive in their favor. Indeed, as a result of Ahidjo’s testimony, the UN cancelled plans to send a team to investigate UPC’s allegations of French misconduct in Cameroon. That team would have exposed to the world the litany of French abuses in Cameroon, from indiscriminate use of violence to forced labor, political prisoners, and voter suppression. Ahidjo’s success at deceiving the UN took away UPC’s winning strategy and condemned Cameroon to a future as a neocolony.

Why was France so interested in Cameroon?

To understand how the CFA franc works – and what Ramadier and Ahidjo were conspiring to do – it is necessary to understand why countries had colonies to begin with. Why were colonies worth fighting bloody wars over?

The entire reason European nations wanted colonies was to get raw materials from them for cheap, then force the colonies to buy goods manufactured by the colonizers. If you think back to your high school American history class, the American Founding Fathers were incensed by the British policy of mercantilism, which did exactly that: the British got cheap raw materials from the American colonies because it was illegal for the Americans to seek a better price by selling to the Dutch, for example. And since it was illegal for the American colonies to import Spanish manufactured goods, for example, they were forced to pay high prices for British goods because the British didn’t have to compete on cost with anyone. In all, the Founding Fathers realized that the colonies were being impoverished in order to boost the British economy.

This is precisely why France held Cameroon as a colony. Ramadier and Ahidjo aspired to maintain this unfair relationship so that France could maintain the major benefits of colonization despite Cameroon being independent on paper. The key instrument that allowed this to happen was the CFA franc.

In Africa’s Last Colonial Currency, Fanny Pigeaud and Ndongo Samba Sylla exhaustively document the many ways the CFA franc impoverishes the 15 African countries that use it, Cameroon included. We will get the idea of how harmful the CFA franc is by looking at just one aspect, but keep in mind throughout this section that we’re only scratching the surface of how exploitative this setup is.

The most important feature of the CFA franc is the fixed exchange rate. If you’ve ever traveled to another country, you had to exchange your US dollars for the currency of the country you were visiting. Obviously, you can’t buy anything in US dollars in Toronto, for example, so you have to exchange US dollars for Canadian dollars. The exchange rate determines how many Canadian dollars you get when you exchange an American dollar.

Exchange rates are normally determined by the market. For example, one US dollar has always been worth more than a Canadian dollar – a single US dollar will get you 1.2 Canadian dollars, for example. That’s because more people want US dollars than Canadian dollars – there are more people who want to trade their Canadian dollars to get US dollars than there are people who want to trade in their US dollars to get Canadian dollars. The US dollar is considered strong relative to the Canadian dollar; the Canadian dollar is considered weak relative to the US dollar.

It is unfortunate that the words “strong” and “weak” are used to describe currencies because the terms imply that it’s better to have a strong currency than a weak one. But that’s not necessarily true. Continuing with our example, the fact that the Canadian dollar is weak relative to the US dollar has advantages for Canada. Because one US dollar is worth more than one Canadian dollar, a US dollar can buy more Canadian stuff than it can buy American stuff. That creates an advantage for Canadian companies that export goods for sale in the US; a product manufactured in Canada will cost less in the US than that same product made in America, simply because of the exchange rates.

By contrast, since a Canadian dollar cannot buy as much American stuff as Canadian stuff, items that Canada cannot make on its own and must import from the US are more expensive. Canadians have to pay higher prices for imported goods simply because of exchange rates. In sum, there are positives and negatives of having a strong currency; there are positives and negatives of having a weak currency.

The CFA franc does not work like this. Rather than the exchange rate being determined by economic conditions – the relative number of people trying to trade a CFA franc for a French franc – the exchange rate is fixed. It was initially set at 1.7 CFA franc for 1 French franc, though this has been changed a few times (and obviously had to change when France adopted the Eurodollar).

So, a French franc was worth nearly twice a CFA franc. You might think that means that the CFA franc is very weak. In fact, the CFA franc was very strong – were market conditions allowed to take their course, the CFA franc would have been far, far weaker – the exchange rate could have been 3, 4, or even 5 CFA francs to one French franc. So in practice, the CFA franc was far, far stronger than it should have been.

Thinking back to our example, the fact that the US dollar is a little bit strong relative to the Canadian dollar means that Canadian exports to the US are less expensive, while US imports into Canada are more expensive. With this in mind, it starts to become clear why an artificially strong CFA franc is so detrimental to Cameroon, and so beneficial to France. Because the CFA franc is so strong, any goods it imports from France are artificially very, very cheap. This gives French companies a huge advantage – French-made goods will always be cheaper than Cameroonian-made goods simply because of the exchange rate. This reproduces one of the major advantages of colonization – rather than using military force to do so, exchange rates highly incentivize or force Cameroonian consumers to buy French-made goods, thus profiting French corporations. It also stifles the development of domestic Cameroonian businesses, which are forced to compete with deeply subsidized French goods.

Remember, exchange rates affect not only imports but also exports. A strong currency means that Cameroonian products are artificially expensive when exported to other countries. This means that coffee grown in Cameroon for the European market will be more expensive than coffee grown in Guatemala or India, for example. The result is that Cameroon has a very difficult time selling its exports. Because Cameroon’s economy is based primarily on exports, the CFA franc guarantees that Cameroon will remain a desperately poor country – all so French corporations can make a little more profit exporting to Cameroon.

In addition to the exchange rates, Ahidjo agreed to banking regulations that seem reasonable on paper but in practice make it extremely difficult for the banking system to make loans. Ahidjo also agreed to import restrictions that create practically insurmountable obstacles for Cameroonian companies to import goods; since Cameroon has a negligible manufacturing base, restrictions on imports stifles the development of Cameroonian commerce. The French control the boards of the central banks of the CFA franc countries; there is nowhere else in the world where such an outrageous arrangement exists and it would be like Pakistan controlling the American Federal Reserve. Ahidjo also committed Cameroon to depositing all of its foreign currency reserves in Paris.

With all of these unfair arrangements, is it any wonder Cameroon is one of the poorest countries in the world?

To tie this all together, let’s return to your high school American history class. Imagine King George has just been brought the Declaration of Independence. “The American colonies are too profitable,” he says. “We must go to war.”

“But wait,” says an advisor, “there might be a better way. What if we were to give the American colonies independence, but with significant strings attached. What if, instead of using outright military force and coercion to profit from the colonies, we used currency and banking regulations? I’ve devised a series of currency and banking rules that, if accepted by the Americans, would maintain all the advantages of colonization.”

This is what’s meant by the term neocolonialism: rather than forcibly stealing labor and wealth with a military and police state, countries like France allow their colonies to be nominally independent while exploiting them with unfair trade, currency, banking, and other arrangements. And rather than use their own military and police state, they prop up dictators to ensure the victims of this system don’t have a say in their government. As the mercenary armies, villagization, pacification zones, and massacres demonstrate, neocolonialism can be just as violent as colonization, and perhaps even more insidious to reverse. And Ahidjo and Biya’s rule as dictator proves that neocolonialism can be just as repressive: Bonus Chapter 2 details Ahidjo and Biya’s notorious secret police, brutal and corrupt internal security forces, concentration camps, censorship, and more. Finally, as the CFA franc demonstrates – again netting the French an estimated hundreds of millions to billions of dollars per year – it can be just as profitable.

Meanwhile, back in Cameroon

With this background, we can return to the history of Cameroon. It’s 1958 and Ramadier and Ahidjo have just completed their coup. Ahidjo is suddenly President of Cameroon.

In Bonus Chapter 1, we learned a great deal about the Cameroonian independence movement, and how Ahidjo was one of its foremost opponents. Obviously, with independence overwhelmingly popular, an outspoken opponent of independence like Ahidjo could never have won a fair election. Furthermore, Ahidjo certainly couldn’t have won an election with the platform of signing away Cameroon’s future via the CFA franc. Yet that’s exactly what he did.

With Cameroon committed to the CFA franc and other unfair agreements, the French plan was nearly complete. The last step was to make Ahidjo a dictator. If Cameroon were ever allowed to hold free and fair elections, Ahidjo would certainly lose, and his replacement would tear up the outrageous neocolonial agreements Ahidjo signed that condemned Cameroon to decades of poverty.

To make him a dictator, Ramadier handed over the military and secret police the French had built up, as well as the mercenary army fighting in rural Cameroon – everything anyone would need to make themselves a dictator. Crucially, Ahidjo’s war machine and police state still relied on French funding and coordination; Ahidjo couldn’t betray the French because he could not operate without them.

Ironically, once formally independent, Ahidjo asked the French to send reinforcements. The French sent two battalions of troops. This is quite a turnaround from the disasters in Algeria and Vietnam—the “independent” government inviting the French military. Ostensibly, these soldiers were there to fight the rebels, but the real reason was to help Ahidjo consolidate his rule as dictator.

By the time he finally faced an election in 1965 – seven years after his and Ramadier’s coup – Ahidjo used his control of the mercenary army and police state to establish a single-party system. Ahidjo viciously suppressed the press, peaceful opposition, and the right to free speech and freedom of assembly. Ahidjo ran unopposed, winning 95% of the vote. He was “reelected” in 1970, 1975, and 1980, each time running unopposed and each time supposedly winning 100% of the vote with a 99% turnout. Ahidjo and his policies were so unpopular that it took until 1971 for Ahidjo to finally defeat the armed Cameroonian independence movement.

It’s worth following the fates of the people we met at the beginning of this chapter. Ahidjo generously rewarded anyone of influence who had switched to his side in time and crushed anyone who hadn’t. We discuss this frankly brilliant strategy in Bonus Chapter 2.

Charles Assale, ever the opportunist, quickly recognized what was happening and threw his support behind Ahidjo. Ahidjo awarded him with a promotion to the coveted position of prime minister of the province of East Cameroon. Ruben Um Nyobe didn’t get behind Ahidjo and was killed. Neither did Andre-Marie Mbida, who spent the rest of his life a political prisoner.

It’s darkly fascinating how Ahidjo actually made himself a dictator, and Bonus Chapter 2 covers this sinister yet fascinating history, including how Um Nyobe and Mbida met their demise at Ahidjo’s hands.

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It bears repeating that Cameroon became a desperately poor, sham democracy because that is what the French wanted to happen. There was a peaceful independence movement with overwhelming support throughout the country in the late 1940s and 1950s, and the French could have negotiated a fair, peaceful, and equitable transfer of power to a new, democratic government. Instead, they violently repressed the independence movement with the help of Cameroon’s elites who wanted to preserve their power within the colonial system. Together, they installed one of those elites as president, a man who never could have won a fair election. Ahidjo happily signed away Cameroon’s future to France, committing Cameroon to a path of poverty and misery that could never have come to pass in a democratic system. Moreover, France chose Ahidjo because they knew he would make himself a dictator and then provided him with the tools, support, and incentive to do so. In the end, Cameroon remained a de facto colony of France. As discussed above, the CFA franc is estimated to redistribute billions of dollars from the 15 CFA franc countries to France, each year. Neocolonial agreements like the CFA franc have contributed to Cameroon becoming one of the poorest countries on earth.

The strategy of neocolonial control developed in Cameroon was so successful that the French deployed it against other independence movements in several of its other African colonies. French neocolonial influence over its former African colonies using the model perfected in Cameroonian became so widespread, long-lasting, and insidious that a pithy nickname developed to describe it: Francafrique.

Paul Biya takes over

Cameroon has had only two presidents: Ahidjo and his hand-picked successor Paul Biya. Biya had ascended to prime minister, so when Ahidjo abruptly resigned in 1982, Biya became president and accordingly seized control of Cameroon’s single-party system and its powerful and repressive police state.

By 1983, Ahidjo was in exile in France after his relationship with Biya had soured. In another tragic yet fascinating chapter of Cameroonian history, Biya faced two coups in 1983; the first was probably orchestrated by Ahidjo, the second one surely was. We explore the mystery of what happened between Biya and Ahidjo in Bonus Chapter 3. In any case, Biya used the events as an opportunity to imprison his rivals and consolidate his grip on power. He abruptly called for presidential elections in 1984; he ran unopposed and won 100% of the vote. He also won as the only candidate four years later in the 1988 presidential elections.

By 1990, Biya seemed confident enough in his consolidated power that he was now able to sufficiently rig elections, and allowed opposition parties to operate. Officially, he won the 1992 presidential election with 40% of the vote (his closest opponent received 36%), but the election was certainly rigged in Biya’s favor. He won again in 1997, 2004, 2011, and 2018, all certainly rigged. As mentioned in the last chapter, Biya has stated he will run again in 2025, when he will be 92(!).

Conclusion

We have begun to solve the mystery of why Cameroon is so poor. The newly independent state was forced to adopt the CFA franc as well as other grossly unfair banking, currency, and trade agreements. All of these agreements enrich French corporations while impoverishing Cameroon in a neocolonial arrangement.

Additionally, we solved the mystery of how Cameroon came to be ruled by a kleptocratic dictator. There is no democracy, no way for people to influence the decisions that affect their lives and their country, and no way for people to protect themselves from the elite’s looting of their country’s wealth. But it’s important to emphasize once again that based on how France set up Cameroon’s independence this was the only possible outcome. The French chose a man in Ahidjo whom they knew would make himself a dictator, then secretly gave him the weapons and soldiers he needed to do so. They did this because they knew Ahidjo would help France maintain the benefits of colonization – with agreements like the CFA franc – as long as it enriched him personally, and that these unfair agreements could not survive in a democratic system.

Nonetheless, important questions remain unanswered. Why is Cameroon so indebted? If desertification is caused by irresponsible agricultural practices, why do these practices continue? If desertification is so easy and cheap to reverse, why hasn’t it been? And if land degradation is responsible for a quarter of humanity’s greenhouse gas emissions, why does the wealthy world show so little concern – even out of total self interest – for the Sahel?

Despite centuries of challenges, Cameroon had among the highest incomes and best economic growth rates in all of Africa in the 1960s and 70s. It’s hard to imagine what could have been if Cameroon had been left alone: if the Portuguese had never set up the Atlantic slave trade, if the Germans had not run a barbaric colony, if the French had not installed a heartless dictator.

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When discussing global poverty, it can be hard to keep perspective. These these are real people in real places. To help us keep a healthy perspective, we’re ending with a focus on Cameroonian culture. Cameroon has always had an incredible music scene. Here is legendary Cameroonian saxophonist Manu Dibango’s Soul Makossa — the album that made him the first Cameroonian nominated for a Grammy:

Works Consulted

Richard Joseph. Radical Nationalism in Cameroun. Oxford University Press, London, 1977.

Mark Delancey. Cameroon: Dependence and Independence. Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1989.

Victor de Vine. The Cameroons, from Mandate to Independence. University of California Press, Berkley, 1964.